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Abstract—This paper addresses the facial biometric-enabled
watchlist technology in which risk detectors are mandatory
mechanisms for early detection of threats, as well as for avoiding
offense to innocent travelers. We propose a multiparametric
cost assessment and relative entropy measures as risk detectors.
We experimentally demonstrate the effects of mis-identification
and impersonation under various watchlist screening scenarios
and constraints. The key contributions of this paper are the
novel techniques for design and analysis of the biometric-enabled
watchlist and the supporting infrastructure, as well as measuring
the impersonation impact on e-border performance.
Keywords—Biometrics, automated border control, watchlist, risk
assessment, entropy.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the urgent problems is applying computational
intelligence techniques to address the scenario of travelers
passing through the automated borders [1]. In this scenario,
the two primary functions of the Automated Border Control
(ABC) machine are to perform the following (under the time
constraint of several minutes): 1) authentication by using the
traveler’s appearance and e-passport (most often the e-passport
will include a facial template), and 2) assessment of risk
through the use of a watchlist. A contemporary watchlist
screening technology is unreliable and inefficient [2]. This is
because the watchlist contains only alphanumeric data (name,
data of birth, etc.) which can be altered or forged. One
possible solution for this problem is to add biometric traits
of the person of interest into the watchlist. The biometric
technologies have been proven to be acceptable in entry-exit
concepts for visa visitors [1], [3], but were less successful for
ABC machines due to unacceptable performance degradation
when automation is applied to decision making. Contemporary
ABC machines direct on average 3 out 10 people to manual
control [4]. If a facial-enabled watchlist is integrated into the
system, 5 or more out of 10 people may be directed to the
border officer which leads to significant degradation of the
system’s performance.
There are various approaches to solve this problem. One
approach is to include the use of the biometric menagerie or
Doddington phenomenon [5]. The Doddington phenomenon
studies the effects of impersonation [6], [7] and suggest the
use of multi-biometrics [8] to alleviate the problem. However,
in the current ABC machines, the people of interest are mostly
represented by facial traits from the physical and digital world,
and are less often to be identified by fingerprints or irises [9].
Another approach is to improve the quality of facial traits used
in the watchlist [10]. The improvement of the image quality
can be used to mitigate the effects of plastic surgery [11],
makeup [12], spoofing [13], and age progression [14], [15].
Ideally, the watchlist should contain synthetic facial images
of people of interest; which can be created by composite
machines. Finally, the development of better algorithms, such
as deep learning [16], shall increase the performance and
accuracy of the facial recognition algorithm used by the
watchlist system.
In practice, the main obstacle in achieving an acceptable
solution is the nature of the watchlist: the watchlist contains
mostly low quality facial traits which are the sources of
intentional or un-intentional impersonation, and thus, false
acceptance or rejections. There are various techniques to
mitigate these sources such as mandatory quality management
[17], but this condition is not always possible to create.
The aforementioned problems explain the reason why
biometric-enabled watchlist is still not integrated into the
border control systems. There is an urgency in finding a
solution to this problem, as the use of biometrics may cause
more mismatch cases compared with today’s non-biometric
practice of watchlist check in which the key operation to
address mismatches is the Redress Complaint Disposition
[2]. However, any watchlist check addresses the risk that an
innocent person is identified as a person of interest, and vice
versa, a person of interest is missed. Conceptually, the solution
exists in the form of inference engine over the landscape
of particular solutions such as Doddington menagerie. From
this perspective, the watchlist screening must include the
assessment of impersonation risk before making any decisions.
The above is the motivation of using biometric-enabled
watchlist technology to construct a system that works under
time constraints and specific reliability requirements.
In Section 2, we provide the key definitions and details of
the problem. Our results are introduced in Section 3. In Section
4, we discuss the contribution of this paper and formulate
conclusions.
II. BASIC DEFINITIONS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
The watchlist technology includes the following key compo-
nents: update mechanisms; architecture (usually a distributed
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network); performance metrics (including social impact); so-
cial embedding (capacity of sources of information); watchlist
inference (engine, capacity, and control); and data protection
mechanism.
For the watchlist technology, there are two kinds of risk:
1) Risk of mis-identification caused by the watchlist, and
2) Risk of mis-identification in the course of the watchlist
check for a given traveler.
These different kinds of risk can be addressed in terms of
levels.
Definition 1. Risk level is defined by the following scenarios
in the watchlist application:
Level-I (host system): Given a watchlist, the potential risk
for an arbitrary traveler is defined by the distribution of
probability of error over the data structure in an appropriate
metric.
Level-II (authentication and risk assessment station): Given
a traveler, the risk of his/her mismatch against a watchlist is
defined with respect to the potential risks of this watchlist.
In the host system, Level-I risks are periodically updated
and evaluated to create a “risk landscape”. The ‘risk land-
scape” is then presented to the authentication and risk assess-
ment station located at the border checkpoint, e.g. in airport.
At Level-II, the watchlist risk landscape is applied to a given
traveler once his/her biometric traits are acquired.
Risk is generally understood as a random event that has
unwanted consequences when the event occurs. Risk events
are analyzed in terms of their probability of occurrence and
their impact on the system performance: [18]:
Risk = F (Probability, Impact)
For risk description, the form called risk statement is used.
Risk score can be defined as a numerical value, or can
be presented in a semantic form such as “Almost/extremely
sure to occur”, “Likely/unlikely to occur”, and “Somewhat
less/greater than an event chance to occur”.
There are many sources of risk for the biometric-enabled
watchlist. One type revolves around face identification across
age progression, facial hair style, accessories, facial implants
and surgery. Another group of risks is related to the architec-
tural and implementation aspect of the watchlist system, such
as compromised server data and malicious actions of server
personnel.
Watchlist technology can be evaluated using a wide variety
of metrics, including risks, costs, and benefits. For exam-
ple, direct benefits include reduced costs for traveler risk
assessment, and prevented/mitigated attacks during execution.
Indirect benefits include lesser chances for successful attacks
and improved public perceptions of e-borders security.
One of the metrics, that we suggest to apply to the
aforementioned scenarios is the relative entropy, or Kullback-
Leibler (KL) measures, which are suggested to be useful
in pattern analysis for analyzing information. In [19], KL
measures are used in the shout detectors in a railway carriages
for improving the security for passengers. The shout detector
aims at estimating the probability that a sound signal will
contain some segments of a shout. The KL divergence is
used as the measure of similarity between the class “shout”
signals and class “background” noise. In addition, we refer
to papers [20], [21], [22] where other information-theoretical
measures have been used for resolving problems related to
image analysis and recognition.
This paper addresses the risks of application of watchlists
containing facial images of persons of interest. Compared
to traditional watchlists used in ABC machines, biometric
watchlist are characterized by additional risks. These risks
should be detected before making any decision. Such detectors
are intended for early manifestation of potential threats as
well as for reducing or avoiding the possibility of treating
an innocent traveler as a suspect. In addition, these detectors
should operate with various data structures because of various
nature of risks.
The key source of impersonation is biometric diversity
which is a robust empirical phenomenon that makes a per-
fect separation into classes in the recognition process hardly
possible. Sources of impersonation include the following [4],
[8]: (a) permanent and temporary biometric abnormalities,
(b) imperfection of the biometric acquisition techniques, and
(c) algorithmic recognition differences and imperfections. The
main countermeasures for impersonation, or conditions of im-
munity to impersonation, is to improve the quality of both the
biometric samples and refine the pattern recognition algorithm.
In e-borders, impersonation is specified by the various
factors such as recognition mode (verification for e-passport
holders or/and identification for risk assessment via watch-
lists), carrier (semantic in interview supported machines or
biometric data in ABC machines), depth of embedding in
social infrastructure, and privacy issue (how deeply national
legislation allows to profile travelers for risk assessment).
An appropriate metric for the biometric-enabled recogni-
tion known as Doddington categorization is well studied for
various modalities [5], [8], including the database which we
used in experiments [23], as well as the extended Doddington
categorization [7].
Definition 2. Doddington metric is defined as the four type
classification of recognition process: Category I (‘sheep’), rec-
ognized normally (have high genuine scores and low impostor
scores); Category II (‘goats’), hard to recognize (have low
genuine scores); Category III (‘wolves’), good at impersonat-
ing (have high impostor scores); and Category IV (‘lambs’),
easy to impersonate (have high genuine and impostor scores).
The process of determining the Doddington categories is
based on analyzing the order of the recognition scores (’goats’
for genuine and ’wolves’ and ’lambs’ for imposter). In this pa-
per, 2.5% of the population is selected as the ’goats’, ‘wolves’
and ‘lambs’ categories because 2.5% signifies two standard
deviations from the mean. In the case of our experimental
setup, ‘goats’ are 15 individuals (out of 568) that obtained the
lowest genuine scores. Similarly, the ’wolves’ and ’lambs’ are
15 individuals (out of 568) that achieved the highest imposter
scores. Finally, ’sheep’ are individuals that neither belong to
the ’goat’ nor the ’wolf’ categories.
The extended Doddington’s categorization [7] include
’doves’, ’chameleons’, ’ghosts’, and ’worms’. Later in the
paper we will use ’worms’, which are individuals exhibiting
the features of both ’goats’ (have low genuine scores) and
’wolves’ (high impostor scores).
Typical examples of the risk of the watchlist screening,
using Doddington metric are given in Fig. 1: left pair of images
results in mis-identification, and the right pair illustrates the
impersonation effect.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 1. Images of subjects in Doddington metric: (a) and (b) are ’goat’
subject; (c) an image of a ’wolf/lamb’ subject that looks similar to subject
(d) (images are from the LFW database [24]).
Doddington’s phenomenon is not stable and depends on
many factors [7]. Doddington’s detector utilizes two classes
of match scores: genuine and impostor match scores.
Definition 3. Genuine and impostor match scores are derived
from comparing two biometric samples belonging to the same
and different individuals, respectively.
Our experiments concern with the following scenarios of
the border crossing passage:
Scenario 1: The traveler is a person of interest, he/she belongs
to the class of ’goats’ and, thus, poses a risk of not being
matched against the watchlist, and, consequently, passing
through the border control without being detected.
Scenario 2: The traveler is not a person of interest, he/she
belongs to the class of ‘lambs’ (and ‘wolves’ in a sym-
metric matcher) and thus, might match against someone
on the watchlist and generate a false alert and the likely
RCD (Redress Complaint Disposition) procedure;
Scenario 3: The traveler is a person of interest, he/she belong
to the class of ‘wolves’ and may create a lot of matches
against the watchlist, thus, causing logistic problems;
however, this case may not be what the attacker wants
as this event will still alert border control.
In the current ABC machines, different kinds of biometrics
are used for identification including fingerprints, faces, iris,
and/or retina. Each biometric has been shown to behave inde-
pendently of each other, thus each biometric will provide their
own unique Doddington categories. A study was performed in
[25] that shows the risk calculated using face and fingerprint
biometrics are unique.
In this paper, we chose to use facial databases to simulate
the watchlists because faces are one of the most common and
least invasive biometrics. Databases FRGC V2.0 and Faces-in-
the-Wild (LFW) [24] contain facial images of various quality.
We used commercially available recognition software Verilook
for facial images (one commercial software examined in the
FRVT 2013 NIST competition [26]), from Neurotechology.
III. WATCHLIST RISK LANDSCAPE
In this Section, we introduce two types of risk detectors.
The first one is using the idea of tracking a set of parameters
(error rates) which are related to various sources of risks. We
called this process a multiparametric cost assessment. The idea
of second detector is inspired by information theory.
A. Detector I: Multiparametric cost assessment
Our goal is to estimate risks for decision-making using Dod-
dington’s categorization and multiparametric cost functions.
We define the cost function using the following control param-
eters of unstable Doddington phenomenon: (a) the threshold
and (b) the cost of false rejection and false acceptance errors.
Definition 4. Watchlist screening or negative identification,
establishes whether a traveler is not on the watchlist. It is
characterized by False Negative (FN) (miss-match, or miss-
identification) errors and False Positive (FP), or False Alarm
(false detection, or impersonation).
The corresponding error rates are called a False Negative
Rate (FNR) and a False Positive Rate (FPR) [27]. A FP results
is a convenience problem, since an innocent traveler is denied
access and needs to be manually checked or examined to get
access.
It is documented that an expected overall error rate, E(T ),
of a general recognition system can be estimated using likeli-
hood of both rates given a threshold, T , as well as the prior
probability PI of a random user being an impostor and the
prior probability PG of a user being genuine [27]:
E(T ) = FAR(T )× PI + FRR(T )× PG (1)
where the FRR is False Rejections Rate and FAR is False
Acceptance Rate. Equation 1 represents a probability that a
random trial will result in an error for that particular matcher
given threshold T .
The overall expected error (Equation 1) can be used to
define a cost associated with each error, such as the cost of
false positives, CFP , and the cost of false negatives, CFN .
For a watchlist, the expected cost of each match decision is
evaluated by Equation [27]:
Cost = CFN × FNR× PG + CFP × FPR× (1− PG) (2)
Consider a watchlist that contains biometric data on n
people; let m be the number of travelers passing through
the border control point (denoted by FPR(1)). Let the cost
of a wanted person to be mis-identified and the cost of an
unnecessary ‘bottleneck’ be CFN and CFP, respectively.
Definition 5. Risk of the watchlist screening is defined as the
overall error rate with respect to a certain threshold T [27]:
Risk(T ) = FNR(T)+
CFN × (1− PG)
CFP × PG × FPR(T ) (3)
In Doddington’s metric, the category of ‘goats’ is associated
with high rejection rate. We will attribute high FNR to
the ’goats’ and ’worms’ categories. Also, the category of
‘wolves/lambs’, as well as ’worms’, contributes to FPR. Let
us assume that the cost of mis-identification of a wanted person
is 10 times higher than the cost of mismatch of a regular
traveler, CFN = 10× CFP; given PG = 0.1.
Risk(T ) = FNR(T ) + 90× FPR(T )
Let us denote Doddington category as Di, where i indicates
the category such that D1 is ’sheep’, D2 is ’goat’, D3 is
’wolf/lamb’ and D4 is ’worm’, Prior probability of a random
traveler being genuine, P (G,Di), and imposter, P (I,Di),
depends on the prior probabilities of that traveler belonging
to i-th Doddington category, Di:
P (G,Di) = P (G)× P (Di) (4)
P (I,Di) = P (I)× P (Di) (5)
Finally, using Equations 4 and 5 the Doddington landscape,
obtained using the Doddington metric defined in Definition 2,
can be defined in terms of cost assessment:
Costi(G) = CFN × FNRi × P (G,Di) (6)
Costi(I) = CFP × FPRi × P (I,Di) (7)
Equations 6 and 7 states that:
1) The scenarios for genuine and imposter traveler should
be distinguished;
2) The cost of these scenarios can be controlled by security
personnel via weights CFN and CPN ;
3) The FNR and FPR impact the cost directly;
4) The prior probabilities (P (G,Di) and P (I,Di)) control
the amount of impact a random traveler put on the cost,
given his genuine/imposter identity and assigned Doddington
category.
5) The cost of assessment is the product of the cost of error
(CFN and CPN ), the chance of error (FNR and FPR), and
the influence caused by the specific traveler (P (G,Di) and
P (I,Di), respectively).
Table I contains the estimation of risk in terms of a cost
function, FNR and FPR for three thresholds T = 10, 50, 100
for various Doddington classes. We can conclude that:
1) The threshold T impacts the value of risk. Increasing
the value of the threshold will increase the FNR risk and
decrease the FPR risk.
2) A ‘goat’ can influence the cost of FN while a ‘wolf’
can impact the cost of FP . A worm, exhibiting the features
of both a ’goat’ and a ’wolf’, can control the cost of both FN
and FP .
3) The quality of images in a database can influence the
impact a chosen set of thresholds can cause. A database with
high quality images (FRGC) will generate higher match scores
than a database with low quality (LFW) images.
TABLE I
WATCHLIST RISK LANDSCAPE IN TERMS OF COST METRIC WITH RESPECT
TO THE TWO RISK CLASSES FOR VARIOUS THRESHOLDS.
”FNR Risk” ”FNR Risk” ”FPR Risk” ”FPR Risk”
Goat Worm Wolf Worm
(×CFN ) (×CFN ) (×CFP ) (×CFP )
T FRGC database
10 1.70×10−7 0 0 0
50 1.01×10−5 0 0 0
100 2.31×10−5 0 0 0
T LFW database
10 1.45×10−5 7.22×10−7 1.19×10−3 2.40×10−2
50 1.45×10−5 7.22×10−7 0 0
100 1.45×10−5 7.22×10−7 0 0
B. Detector II: Relative entropy metric
It can be shown that Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence,
or relative entropy can be useful measure for evaluating the
Doddington’s landscape given the similarity of probabilistic
distributions. The relative entropy metric is defined by the
equation [28]:
Relative entropy = D(P ||Q) =
∑
j
pj log2
pj
qj
where P = [p1, p2, . . . pn] and Q = [q1, q2, . . . qn] are
probabilistic distributions. The KL divergence is a positive
value, D(P ||Q) ≥ 0. If the distributions are the same, then
the KL divergence is zero; the closer they are, the smaller the
value of D(P ||Q). Hence, the divergence can be computed
for any pair of Doddington’s categories.
For example, consider the evidence of non-cooperative and
cooperative traveler in Fig. 2. The risks of traveler 04408
(which is on the watchlist) are evaluated in the KL metric
over Doddington’s landscape. In addition to the Doddington’s
categories, we plot the KL measures of the traveler 04408
while being non-cooperative (04408d35), and cooperative
(04408d33), in Fig. 3. We observe that:
1) The image of a non-cooperative traveler (04408d35) will
yield a probability density function with a spike located near
the match score of 50.
2) The image of a cooperative traveler (04408d33) will yield
a probability density function that is more spread between all
the possible match scores with a peak at a match score of 90.
Fig. 2. Left plane: Non-cooperative traveler (04408d35) waiting for service
in front of an ABC machine; Right plane: Cooperative traveler (04408d33)
following the controlled face acquisition at the machine (subject from the
FRGC database [29]).
Fig. 3. The probability density function for traveler 04408 from the FRGC
database over Doddington’s landscape.
In this paper, we extend the applications of relative entropy
to the analysis of risk landscape for a watchlist check. The
KL divergence is used to measure the difference between two
probability density functions. In this scenario, the KL measure
of difference can be used to approximate the probability of
a traveler belonging to the different types of Doddington’s
categories. In terms of Bayes risk in a decision making system,
“an expected loss is called a risk” [30]:
R(kl|x) =
t∑
j=1
λ(kl|wj)D(wj |x)
where t is the number of Doddington’s categories, R(kl|x)
is the conditional risk of using KL decision (kl) given the
probability density function of a person (x), λ(kl|wj) is the
loss of using KL decision (kl) for the Doddington’s categories
(wj) and D(wj |x) is the KL divergence between wj and x.
Table II contains the KL measure calculated for particular
traveler in each category with respect to the average (prior)
distribution of score for the classes. For example, the risk of
traveler 4408 is calculated as follows:
R(kl|x4408) = λ(kl|ws)D(ws|x4408)
+ λ(kl|wg)D(wg|x4408) + λ(kl|wwl)D(wwl|x4408) (8)
Table II contains the KL measure calculated for particular
traveler in each category with respect to the average (prior)
distribution of score for the classes.
Based on a typical security scenario, we can assume the
following:
1) ’Sheep’ have low risk because they do not cause many
mis-identifications or rejections,
2) ’Wolves/Lambs’ have medium risk because they only
impact false accepts, which may cause false alarms regarding
regular travelers being mistaken for the wanted persons, while
the persons on the watchlist are unlikely to be missed, as they
would rather produce multiple matches against the watchlist,
and
3) ’Goats’ have high risk because they cause false rejects,
which may cause a passage of a wanted person whose current
appearance at the border checkpoint was not matched against
his/her facial image on the watchlist.
TABLE II
RELATIVE ENTROPY (D(wj |x)) BETWEEN ’SHEEP’ AND OTHER
DODDINGTON CATEGORIES USING THE FRGC DATABASE.
Traveler ’Goats’ ’W/L’ ’Sheep’ R(kl|x)
’G
oa
ts
’
Genuine Scores
4315 19.3834 1.5000 1.2857 12.2086
4493 21.4335 1.4057 1.2061 13.4024
4472 8.1941 1.2029 1.0842 5.3858
Imposter Scores
4315 4.9675 1.9530 4.7111 4.0375
4493 4.7866 1.8759 4.5387 3.8886
4472 7.2058 2.8461 6.8617 5.8635
’W
ol
ve
s/
L
am
bs
’
Genuine Scores
4202 75.8104 1.3291 0.3451 45.9195
4408 44.6677 1.1112 0.3347 27.1675
4435 84.4652 1.2451 0.0621 51.0589
Imposter Scores
4202 4.7009 1.8339 4.4565 3.8164
4408 4.9644 1.9450 4.7082 4.0330
4435 4.6357 1.8120 4.3935 3.7644
’S
he
ep
’
Genuine Scores
2463 38.2000 1.3801 0.8165 23.4157
4201 55.8247 1.1022 0.2087 33.8464
4203 42.4947 0.8047 0.3470 25.7729
Imposter Scores
2463 8.4654 3.3284 8.0840 6.8862
4201 7.0656 2.7951 6.7258 5.7505
4203 7.3538 2.9030 7.0048 5.9837
In this given scenario, we’ll adopt the following loss values:λ(kl|ws) =λ(kl|wg) =
λ(kl|ww/l) =
0.1
0.6
0.3
 Low RiskHigh Risk
Medium Risk
It follows from this taxonomical view that:
Low watchlist check risk is assigned to the travelers who do
not impact the Doddington landscape or their impact is
negligible.
Medium watchlist check risk is assigned to the travelers
who are wrongly detained, and, therefore, are costing ad-
ditional resources to resolve (officer’s time and suspect’s
discomfort).
High watchlist check risk is assigned to the travelers who
have been identified as “wanted“, but nevertheless, have
gained access to facility.
Finally, the total risk of watchlist screening for Traveler
4408 is calculated based on Equation 8:
R(kl|x4408) = 0.6 · 44.6677
+ 0.3 · 1.1112 + 0.1 · 0.3347 = 27.1675
In the last column of Table II, the R(kl|x) represents the
calculated risk for each traveler using the relative entropy.
Since the calculated KL values for ’goats’ is a much larger
value than the other categories, ’goats’ contribute a greater
portion of the calculated risk. In this scenario, the risk value
can be interpreted as the similarity between a traveler and
a ’goat’ class. A high R(kl|x) indicates a close similarity
to the ’wolves/lambs’ category, a low R(kl|x) represents
a closeness to the ’goat’ category and a medium R(kl|x)
expresses a close proximity to the ’sheep’ category. For
example, a R(kl|x) = 5.3858 (genuine score for traveler 4472)
indicates that the traveler belongs to the ’goat’ category and
a R(kl|x) = 45.9195 represents a ’wolf/lamb’ category.
Some methods of risk assessment use cost evaluation as a
way to numerically represent the gains and loss in the event
of a crisis. In general, Equation 2 is proposed to assess the
expected cost. This paper extends this concept and suggests
to apply Equation 2 which not only includes basic FNR and
FPR error rates but also incorporates these error rates to
the Doddington categories allowing for more specific cost
estimation.
C. Comparison of cost and relative entropy metric
The multiparametric cost and relative entropy metric in-
troduces different views of risk landscape. The cost metric
uses various parameters for controlling the factors of risk. For
example, security personnel can increase or decrease the alarm
level depending on various social or scenario factors. The
relative entropy metric shows the relationships of different risk
patterns of the watchlist landscape. These control indicators
convey proactive information on watchlist use, for example,
after updating. Let us consider, in more detail, the comparison
of these metrics:
1) The multiparametric cost metric offers the control param-
eters of T , CFN and CFP , and generates eight functions of
cost (’sheep’, ’goat’, ’wolf/lamb’ and ’worm’ categories with
two cost function per category). Since FNR only impacts
’goat’ and ’worm’, and FPR only influences ’wolf/lamb’
and ’worm’, only four of the eight cost functions are being
considered. In summary, the cost metric provides four cost
functions that can be used to calculate the risk associated for
each Doddington category at a specific threshold.
2) The relative entropy metric compares the historical data
of match scores associated with each Doddington category
with a selected traveler’s score information to generate a
similarity metric. By finding the product of the relative entropy
metric and the loss value associated with the Doddington
category, it allows for the estimation of a numerical risk value
of a selected traveler based on how similar his/her match
score is to a Doddington category. In addition, these metrics
can be further analyzed by machine learning methods such as
convolutional neural networks or fuzzy logic to obtain better
association between a traveler and their Doddington categories.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The risk detectors proposed in this paper use both the
Doddington categories of impersonation phenomenon, and
the information-theory approach called Kullback-Leibler mea-
sures. We experimentally demonstrate the effects of mis-
identification and impersonation under various watchlist sce-
narios and constraints, and measure their impact, in terms of
cost and risks, on the border control system performance.
Despite impressive results of pattern recognition in foren-
sic applications and entry-exit systems used only for visa-
travelers, the facial watchlists in identification mode are still
not present in border crossing applications, due to both
technological and logistics challenges [1]. Addressing these
challenges, our study suggests as follows:
1) Doddington metrics shall be used to categorize a watchlist
to account for the unstable nature of a watchlist system.
2) Scenario-oriented multiparametric cost function shall be
derived for evaluation of the risks of impersonation.
The proposed cost function is adapted to the specific
scenario of watchlist screening by the set of recognition
related indicators. This means that we can control the
overall unstable Doddington landscape by its performance
parameters (T , FRR, FAR), as well as security related
parameters, CFN , and CFP .
3) Relative entropy metric for evaluating the potential risk of
the watchlist screening for a given traveler with respect to
Doddington categories. It is reasonable to incorporate en-
tropy measures into Bayes risk model because it offers the
possibility for numerically estimation risks of watchlist
check associated with each traveler. In addition, this risk
value can be controlled by the loss parameter (λ(kl|w))
that is unique to each Doddington category.
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